With the rapid development of vehicular ad hoc Network (VANET), it is gaining significant popularity and receiving increasing attentions from academics and industry in security and efficiency. To address security and efficiency issues, a selfauthentication and deniable efficient group key agreement protocol is proposed in this paper. This scheme establishes a group between road-side unit (RSU) and vehicles by using self-authentication without certification authority, and enhances certification efficiency by using group key (GK) transmission method. At the same time, to avoid the attacker to attack the legal vehicle by RSU, we adopt deniable group key agreement method to negotiation session key (sk) and use it to transmit GK between RSU. In addition, vehicles not only broadcast messages to other vehicles, but also communicate with other members in the same group. So group communication is necessary in VANET. Finally, the security and performance analysis show that our scheme is security, meanwhile the verification delay, transmission overheard and message delay are more efficient than other related schemes in authentication, transmission and communication.
Introduction
VANET is essentially a branch of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) and have many prominent features, such as Vehicle moving at high speed, rapidly changing topology, short interaction time between nodes and so on. In addition, the nodes of VANET compose two parts, one is vehicles equipped with on-board unit (OBU) and another is road-side unit (RSU), vehicles communicate with each other as well as RSU through open wireless channel [1] . Due to the peculiar attribute of VANET, it can provide some security services including traffic information, traffic safety warning and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers. However, VANET also faces many challenges, such as security and privacy. Therefore, VANET need to meet some security requirements to resist security threats, as follows:
 Message integrity and authentication: Vehicles could verity that a message is indeed sent and signed by another vehicle without being modified by anyone  Privacy: Vehicle's real identity should not be linked to any message, and other vehicles or RSU cannot reveal any vehicle's real identity by analyzing multiple messages sent of it.
significantly improved, but it has the problem of privacy. Later, [6] introduced "an efficient identity-based batch verification scheme", in which the efficiency of the vehicle certification can be improved. However, both [5] and [6] have privacy issues.
For the privacy, [7] suggested that every vehicle should be pre-loaded with a large number of anonymous public and private keys, and the corresponding public key certificates. It avoids being tracked to a certain extent by using this method, but it will waste a lot of time on checking the list of revoked certificates. [8] , [9] by pre-loading the large pseudonym to achieve privacy protection. [10] proposed an efficient vehicle group forming technique, vehicles establish a reliable group to enhance the security and privacy protection by using trusted communication equipment (TPM, Platform Module Trusted). [11] proposed using two kinds of top-level mechanisms of PKI system, which are information signature and group signature. In addition, it also adopted batch verification method. So, this scheme not only met the requirements of privacy protection, but also reduced the computation overhead.  TA: TA is a trusted certification center of the whole network. It responses to register and manages all nodes in the VANET and exposes the true identity of the valid vehicles and releases the information of the revoked vehicles. In this paper, TA allocate the certificate parameters to RSU and vehicles. As usual, TA is assumed powered with sufficient storage capability and infeasible for any adversary to compromise.
Preliminaries

Network Model
 RSU: RSU are densely distributed in the roadside. They connect with TA by wired links while using wireless links to vehicles. In this protocol, RSU is used to authenticate the validity of the vehicles and negotiate with the vehicles to form the group. In addition, it help TA liable of the vehicles which have illegal act. The adjacent RSU know each other's public key and can communicate with them.
 Vehicles: Vehicles are equipped with OBU, which periodically broadcast traffic related status information to improve the road environment, traffic safety, and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers [12] .The communication among them is based on the DSRC protocol. 
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Proposed Scheme
In this section, we describe our scheme with the following process: system initialization, the deniable group key negotiation of RSU, the authentication between RSU and Vehicles, the negotiation and update of the group key between RSU and Vehicles, the communication among the group. The notations used throughout the paper are listed in Table 1 
Deniable group key negotiation of RSU
We adopted two-round deniable group key agreement protocol [13] , which is used to establish a confidential channel for communications. Simultaneously, it allows participants to deny that they have ever participated in group key agreement. Firstly, we contract a group (it include all RSU) and then generate the session key (sk) between RSU by using deniable group key agreement, which is the preparation work for the group key transmission mechanism. The purposed is to prevent the attacker to track the legitimate vehicles from RSU and ensures the security of group key transmission. The deniable group key negotiation of RSU as follows:
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The authentication between RSU and vehicles
With the RSU as the center, which has a wide range of communication and strong computing power, establish the group according to the geographic area on the road.
After the vehicle get into the range of RSU, vehicles need to verify identity and negotiating key to join the group. And then vehicles can communicate with nearby vehicles and RSU. In this paper, the authentication is going on between RSU and vehicles without TA participating in it. At the same time, the legal vehicle will be 
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4.4 The negotiation and update of the group key
1) The negotiation of the group key
After the vehicle has been completed the authentication, it requires to communicate with RSU and other vehicles. Therefore, the vehicle need to join in the group centered on RSU and negotiate the group key ( GK ). The negotiation between i RSU and i V is shown in Fig. 3 Step 1: Vehicle i V chooses a random number Step 2: GK is the primary group key. 2) The update of the group key In order to guarantee the communication of primary group members do not be affect and the leaved vehicle cannot communicate with the group members. The group key require to be update when vehicles join or leave the group. 
Step 2: The group member ( || || (.)) Step 1:
RSU , here C is a fixed value, it explains the request of one to one communication.
Wod , obtains C by using GK decode it and according to C broadcast the message
Step 3: 
Analysis Of The Proposed Scheme
In this section, we will analysis the scheme from security requirements which have been referred to in Introduction. Have an assumption that the shared key k is kept secret, then a node message cannot be forged by the attacker, and the scheme is secure against existential forgery, adaptive chosen message attack under random oracle model. First, consider the Game between the challenger and the attacker. 
4) Non-repudiation
To avoid the vehicle deny ever sent the message which led to the accident, TA should be able to reveal the true identity of the sender from the message. In this scheme, TA can get the pseudonym from the message, and get the public key of the sender with RSU assist. Then, TA uses its private key, the public key i V PK of the sender and the pseudonym to have a computation as following: message by RSU to update the group key. However the message is encode by the previous group key, vehicle cannot decode it and get the previous group key. So, our scheme is backward-secure.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we compare with some related work from verification delay and transmission overheard, then have a simulation on message delay by NS2.34.
Verification delay
The experiment is running on an Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHZ machine proposed in reference [14] . According to [6] Fig. 5 illustrates that the verification delay radio compared with others scheme for RSU verify the vehicles when the illegal vehicles is 5%. From the Fig. 5 , with the increase of certified vehicles, the ratio of ACP, IBV are on the rise, but they are less than 1. Therefore, the verification delay of our scheme is less than them. And compared with the ECPP, RMAKA, the verification speed of our scheme is about 94% faster than that of ECPP, and is about 75% faster than that of RMAKA. [17] 167n ABAKA [19] 84n ARGBV [20] 63n Our scheme 58n
According to reference [18] , each vehicle send message every 300ms. In this paper, the length of pseudonym is 42bytes and HMAC is 16bytes. Fig. 6 and TABLE 3 illustrates that the transmission overhead of RMAKA, ABAKA, ARGBV and our scheme. From the Fig. 6 , we can see the transmission overhead of us is least. is the time that entity k verify the message from entity n. Fig. 7 The message delay and traffic density Fig. 7 illustrates the impact of vehicle's number versus average delay. In this paper, the communication of us divided on two aspects. One is between OBU, and another is between RSU and OBU. Fig. 7 shows that the message delay also increase with the increase of vehicle number. The message delay of ABAKA, ARGBV and RMAKA are bigger than us. So, with the increase of vehicle quantity, the message delay of our scheme is least.
Conclusions
In this paper, we proposes a self-authenticated deniable efficient group key agreement scheme in VANET. The features of the scheme as following: (1) Employ the no certificate public key system, the authentication process between vehicles and RSU has no authentication center participated in, avoid the time delay problem of TA certificate to speed up the certification. (2) Reduce the frequency of legal vehicles' certification and avoid tracking legal vehicles through RSU by using the deniable group key transmission scheme. (3) In order to alleviate the workload of the group leader and eliminate the possible single point of failure problem by using key negotiation instead of the group leader distribute group key. In the future, we will have a further research on how the vehicles build the group for secure communication by themselves on the way of no public infrastructure.
